Modern attacks routinely breach SCADA networks that are defended to IT standards. This is unacceptable. Defense in depth has failed us. In "SCADA Security" Ginter describes this failure and describes an alternative. Strong SCADA security is possible, practical, and cheaper than failed, IT-centric, defense-in-depth. While nothing can be completely secure, we decide how high to set the bar for our attackers. For important SCADA systems, effective attacks should always be ruinously expensive and difficult. We can and should defend our SCADA systems so thoroughly that even our most resourceful enemies tear their hair out and curse the names of our SCADA systems' designers.
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